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The Uniform Rules on the Liabilityof
Operators of Transport Terminals
PAUL B. LARSEN*
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY**
AND PATRICK J. FALVEY***
INTRODUCTION
The Working Group on Transport Terminal Operators' Liability of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has proposed draft Uniform Rules on the liability of such
operators. The functions of the Working Group are now at an end,
and the draft will next be considered in detail at the UNCITRAL
Plenary Session in May of 1989. While the Plenary will examine all
issues anew, it will use the Working Group's draft as a basis for this
examination. The discussions in the Plenary will not duplicate those
in the Working Group because more countries and international
organizations will participate in the Plenary.
It is not relevant to consider the issue of U.S. adoption of the
Uniform Rules at this stage, since the final content of the Rules is not
yet known. The only objective of the Working Group was to assist
UNCITRAL in shaping the best possible legal instrument. Because
all issues can be reopened at the Plenary it is important that they be
*Attorney, U.S. Department of Transportation; U.S. Representative on the UNCITRAL

Working Group on International Contract Practices.

**Professor of Law, Fordham University; Alternate U.S. Representative on the Working

Group; Member, Board of Editors, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce.
***General Counsel and Deputy Director, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey;
Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Working Group.
Except where otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this article are the authors' and
should not be attributed to any organization with which they are associated.
The entire text of the draft Convention is reproduced in this article, with the authors'
comments following each article.
Because it may ultimately be decided to recommend uniform rules regulating terminal
operators' liability, rather than a convention, the draft approved by the Working Group is
sometimes referred to herein as the "Uniform Rules."
Comments on this article will be appreciated, and may be submitted to Paul B. Larsen, Office
of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590.
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studied thoroughly within the United States, so that the U.S. Delegation will be better able to represent U.S. interests in the Plenary
discussions.
The report on which this article is based describes nearly all of the
issues that were raised during the Working Group's discussions. The
following list of issues is illustrative but not exhaustive:
1. Should the Uniform Rules apply only to those operators who
undertake to operate under the Rules and are recognized as terminal
operators?
2. Should stevedores be included or excluded from the application of
the Uniform Rules?
3. What regime should govern the terminal operator's liability?
4. What should be the limits on liability of the terminal operator?
5. Should the liability limits be breakable in the case of intentional
torts?
6. To what extent should servants and agents be entitled to limit
liability?
7. To what extent should servants and agents lose their rights to limit
liability?
8. Should the terminal operator have the right to recover damages
from shippers for improperly packaged dangerous goods?
9. Should terminal operators be precluded from selling leased containers?
10. How should liability limits be adjusted for inflation?
11. Should the Uniform Rules be made paperless i.e., should computerized notices, requests, and other. documentation be accepted?
BACKGROUND OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION
At its sixteenth session (1983) UNCITRAL decided to place the
subject of the liability of operators of transport terminals (OTT) on its
work program. Following the offer of the International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) to do so, UNCITRAL
requested UNIDROIT to submit its preliminary draft Convention on
the Liability of International Terminal Operators to UNCITRAL for
further work in its more diverse and global forum. At its seventeenth
session (1984) UNCITRAL decided to assign the work to its Working
Group on International Contract Practices. The seventeenth session
also decided that the Working Group could consider other relevant
issues in addition to those raised in the UNIDROIT draft. The
seventeenth session scheduled the Working Group's first meeting for
December 3-14, 1984 in Vienna. The eighteenth session of UNCI-
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TRAL (1985) approved the Group's first report and requested the
UNCITRAL Secretariat to prepare a study of the liability of transport
3
terminals, 2 and prepare draft Uniform Rules governing such liability.
This comment is based on the U.S. Delegation's report on the fourth
and final meeting of the Working Group.
While the United States did not participate in the preparation of the
preliminary draft convention by a group of experts under the auspices
of UNIDROIT the United States has traditionally participated in all
of UNCITRAL's work. The Departments of State and Transportation
believe that the United States should participate in UNCITRAL's
work on this project to ensure that U.S. legal and commercial
interests are given full consideration, whether or not the United
States ever adopts the end product. Because of the interest in this
project in Europe it is quite likely that U.S. trade will eventually be
affected.
In conformity with past practice in preparing for UNCITRAL work
projects, a Study Group of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law was formed in 1984. The Group
is made up of practicing lawyers, house counsel for corporations, law
professors with expertise in the field, and representatives of insurance, business and trade associations having a direct interest in the
carriage and warehousing of goods in international trade. The Group
met for the first time on December 13, 1985, and a second meeting
was held on December 11, 1987 to develop guidance for the January
1988 session of the UNCITRAL Working Group. 4 The Study Group
will meet again to prepare for the 1989 UNCITRAL Plenary Meeting,
which will review and reconsider all issues. The Study Group will
consider the report of the UNCITRAL Working Group, inter alia, to
provide further guidance for the U.S. Delegation.
The purpose of a convention on terminal operators' liability is to
promote world-wide uniformity of law in order to facilitate international trade. One purpose of this project to unify the law is to close
gaps in the liability systems outside of the existing transportation
conventions. Such conventions have been adopted widely; for example, the Warsaw Convention on air carriers' liability has been adopted
by more than 100 countries including the United States; maritime bills

2

Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals, AICN.9/WG.IIIWP.55 (All documentation
is UNCITRAL's, unless otherwise indicated).
3
A/CN.9/WG.IIWP.56.
4See Minutes of the Study Group's Meeting of Dec. 11, 1987, Annex I to this article.
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of lading are governed by the Brussels Convention of 1924, 5 to which
the United States is also a party; and most European countries have
6
adopted international conventions on road and rail carriers' liability.
A multimodal convention on liability of multimodal operators 7 was
adopted in 1980, but has not yet entered into force. These conventions govern carriage but leave open the subject of liability of
non-carrying intermediaries for loss of and damage to goods before
and after carriage. While shippers would be able to recover from
multimodal operators (MTOs) when and if the Multimodal Convention entered in force, the transport terminal operators' liability to the
MTO would be governed by different local laws. Therefore it was
thought desirable to establish an international uniform legal regime
for terminal operators in order to protect such operators, and to
permit recourse actions by carriers, multimodal operators, freight
forwarders and other interested parties.
Prior to the January 1988 Working Group session the UNCITRAL
Secretariat had prepared a revised text of draft Uniform Rules on the
liability of operators of transport terminals, based on discussions and
decisions at the previous session of the UNCITRAL Working
Group.8 The Working Group reviewed and redrafted all of the articles
and prepared a draft convention which was placed before the 21st
session of the UNCITRAL Plenary in April, 1988. That Plenary
decided to consider the draft Convention at its next (22nd) session,
and to send the draft to all States and interested international
organizations for comments. The Secretariat will prepare a compilation of comments received and will also draft final clauses for the
22nd session.
THE DRAFT CONVENTION
Article 1-Definitions
In the text of this Convention:
5
The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. 931, 120 L.N.T.S.
155 (The Hague Rules), implemented by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"), 46
U.S.C. §§ 1300-15.
6
Convention Concerning International Carriage By Rail (COTIF), Berne, 1980, (Cmd.
8535), and Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR),
1956,7 399 U.N.T.S. 189.
United Nations Convention on the International Multimodal Transport of Goods, reprinted
in Appendix II to Driscoll & Larsen, The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of
Goods, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 (1982)
8
Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals, A/CN,9/WG.II/WP.60.
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(a) "Operator of a transport terminal" hereinafter referred to as
"Operator") means a person who, in the course of his business,
undertakes to take in charge goods involved in international carriage in
order to perform or procure the performance of transport-related
services with respect to the goods in an area under his control or in
respect of which he has a right of access or use. However, a person
shall not be considered an operator to the extent that he is responsible
for the goods as a carrier or multimodal transport operator under
applicable rules of law governing carriage;
(b) "Goods" includes a container, pallet or similar article of packaging
or transport if the goods are consolidated or packaged therein and the
article of packaging or transport was not supplied by the operator;
(c) "International carriage" means any carriage in which the place of
departure and the place of destination are identified as being located in
two different States when the goods are taken in charge by the operator;
(d) "Transport-related services" includes such services as storage,
warehousing, loading, unloading, stowage, trimming, dunnaging and
lashing;
(e) "Notice" means a notice given in a form which provides a record
of the information contained therein;
(f) "Request" means a request made in a form which provides a record
of the information contained therein.
Comment
Paragraph (a) defines the term "operator" without referring solely
to his safekeeping functions. The reference to "goods involved in
international carriage" in the same paragraph may be duplicative of
the scope provision in Article 2(1); however, the January 1988
Working Group meeting reviewed it as a convenient reminder that the
Convention applies only to goods in international carriage. Stevedores are presently included within the definition of a transport
terminal operator. The UNCITRAL Plenary will probably revisit and
discuss this issue. It should be noted that the U.S. Study Group is not
in agreement on this issue. Shippers and insurers favor inclusion of
stevedores, because, in their view, it does not make sense to exempt
90% of all terminal operational functions which do not involve storage
from the application of the Uniform Rules. Such an exemption would
eliminate approximately 90% of the functions covered by the proposed draft Convention. In the U.S. Study Group the representative
of the stevedores favors exclusion of stevedores from the Rules.
There is agreement, however, that stevedores should be treated no
less favorably than carriers.
The UNCITRAL Working Group was of the view that exclusion of
stevedores would leave a large gap in rules designed to fill gaps. The
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Group experienced great difficulty in separating stevedoring operations and terminal operational functions. This definitional dilemma is,
in part, caused by changes in the traditional functions of terminal
operators. They now perform a multitude of functions, the storage
function being one of the less important.
The Group believed that the stevedores should receive "comparable protection under the uniform rules" 9 as they would under the
liability rules applicable to the carriers under transport conventions.
It should be noted that articles of packaging or transport are not
included within the definition of goods in Paragraph (b) if they are
used only for the purpose of transporting the goods. Transport
conventions, either specifically or by interpretation, have extended
the definition of "goods" to include packaging and its exclusion here
created the substantial problem subsequently dealt with under Article
10, concerning the right of the terminal operators to sell the very
valuable containers-usually leased-in which the goods are packed,
to satisfy the operator's unpaid charges. Such containers, to be
excluded, must be used for the purpose of consolidation or packaging
of the goods. This limitation will eliminate many means of transport,
such as barges, railway wagons, trailers and chassis from the application of the Uniform Rules on terminal operators' liability.
Paragraph (c) evidences the Working Group's adoption of the U.S.
proposal to define international carriage as carriage in which the
places of departure and destination are identified as being located in
different States when the goods are taken in charge by the terminal
operator.
Paragraph (d) defines transport-related services as including storage, warehousing, loading, unloading, stowage, trimming, dunnaging
and lashing. It should be noted that "operator of a transport terminal" is defined in Paragraph (a) as a person performing "transportrelated services," which, in turn, would include stevedores' services.
However, services which are not related to the transportation of the
goods are not included. For example, financial services related to the
movement of goods are not included, nor is the manufacture or
repackaging of the goods.
Paragraph (e) resulted from the Working Group's attempt to define
"notice." The U.S. Delegation sought to establish that a record of the
notice of loss, damage or delay and of other notices should be made
9

Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the Work of its
Eleventh Session, New York, 18-29 January 1988, A/CN.9/298, at 5 (hereinafter referred to as
"Working Group Report").
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to facilitate the handling of subsequent claims.10 U.S. insurers have
particularly emphasized the need for maintaining such records. This
effort was successful, so that Paragraph (e) now would require that
any notice "must be given in a form which provides a record of the
information contained therein." The view prevailed that the fact that
notice was given and the contents of such notice should be recorded.
The U.S. Delegation also made a major successful effort to permit
paperless records. Therefore Paragraph (e) would permit computerto-computer communication.
Likewise Paragraph (e) provides that any request may be "made in
a form which provides a record of the information contained
therein." For example, Article 5(3) provides that "delay" in handing
over the goods occurs when the operator fails to hand them over
within a reasonable time after receiving a request from the person
entitled to the goods. Such a request would be subject to Paragraph
(e).
Article 2-Scope of Application

(1) This Convention applies to transport-related services performed in
relation to goods which are involved in international carriage:
(a) When the transport-related services are performed by an operator
whose place of business is located in a contracting State, or
(b) When, according to the rules of private international law, the
-transport-related services are governed by the law of a contracting
State.
(2) If the operator has more than one place of business, the place of
business is that which has the closest relationship to the transportrelated services as a whole.
(3) If the operator does not have a place of business, reference is to be
made to the operator's habitual residence.
Comment

Article 2 raises the issue whether States could apply the Uniform
Rules only to those operators who undertake to operate under the
Rules and who are recognized as being terminal operators. Determination of this matter may influence States in deciding whether or not
to adopt the Rules. The U.S. Study Group did not support such an
approach, because it would result in lack of uniformity and predictability of the applicable legal regime."
'ld. at 9.
IlAnnex I.
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Earlier drafts reflected experiments with various rules of private
international law (lex loci contractus, lex loci rei sitae, and others),
but no traditional formula was satisfactory, especially since in Europe
terminals are frequently located on both sides of an international
border. Accordingly the model chosen was taken from the 1980
Vienna Convention on the International Sales of Goods (in force
since January 1, 1988).
Paragraph (1) also reflects the changes made by the Working Group
in the definitions in Article 1. The Uniform Rules would apply to
transport-related services performed by an operator whose business
is located in a contracting State or when, under private international
law, the services are subject to the law of a contracting State. It was
noted that the Uniform Rules do not require the services to be
performed at a transport terminal, nor do the Rules define a "terminal."
Paragraph (2) deals with the problem of an operator who has more
than one place of business. The draft Uniform Rules prefer the place
of business with the closest relationship to the transport-related
services. The approach used derives from Article 10 of the 1980
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (to
which the United States is a party).12
Under Paragraph (3) the operator's habitual residence is to be
considered as the operator's place of business if he has no other.
UNCITRAL may revisit the issue of whether it is necessary to
provide further protection for the terminal operator who does not
know that goods are in international carriage. Earlier drafts attempted
to do this, but there was difficulty in settling on reasonable rules for
the burden of proof. The question will be whether the operator knew
that the goods were in international carriage without looking at the
bill of lading or waybill.

Article 3-Period of Responsibility
The operator shall be responsible for the goods from the time he has
taken them in charge until the time he has handed them over or made
them available to the person entitled to take delivery of them.

12

1982, XI V.B. UNCITRAL at 151, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I.
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Comment

This provision corresponds to a similar provision in Article
4(2)(b)(ii) of the Hamburg Rules,' 3 except that a slightly different
phrasing is used. The UNCITRAL Working Group decided against
conformity with the Hamburg Rules' language "placed them at the
disposal of' and, instead, decided on the phrase "made them
available to" in order to include other modes of carriage in addition
to carriage by water.
Article 4-Issuance of Document

(1) The operator may, and at the customer's request shall, without
reasonable delay, either:
(a) Acknowledge his receipt of the goods by signing a document
produced by the customer identifying the goods and stating their
condition and quantity, or
(b) Issue a signed document acknowledging his receipt of the goods
and the date thereof, and stating their condition and quantity in so far
as they can be ascertained by reasonable means of checking.
(2) If the operator fails to act in accordance with either subparagraph
(a) or (b) of paragraph (1), he is rebuttably presumed to have received
the goods in apparently good condition.
(3) The document referred to in subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1)may
be issued in any form which preserves a record of the information
contained therein.
(4) The signature on the document under paragraph (1) may be in
handwriting, printed, in facsimile, perforated, stamped, in symbols, or
made by any other mechanical or electronic means.
Comment

Paragraph (1) recognizes the current practice that terminal operators most often follow, which is to use the documentation of their
carrier customers. The operators do not usually issue their own
documentation. Under the wording of this paragraph the terminal
operator may acknowledge receipt of the goods either by using the
customer's documentation or by issuing his own document.
The Working Group was of the view that the text of Paragraph (1)
provides adequate flexibility for the operator to deal with customers
13United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (hereinafter referred to as

"Hamburg Rules"). 1978, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/13. The Hamburg Rules provisions (Art. 4)
drew on the earlier wording and interpretation of the 1893 Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96
(1982).
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to their mutual satisfaction. The U.S. Delegation proposed and the
Working Group accepted the understanding that the operator can
satisfy the requirements of Paragraph (1) "by delivering to the
customer a document issued by a third party, such as a carrier, signed
14
on behalf of the operator by the third party."'

One delegation suggested that the operator should be able to enter
reservations on the documentation regarding the condition of the
goods and their quantity. Such a reservation would be desirable in
those situations where the operator does not have adequate opportunity to check the goods and is asked to accept documentation
issued by a third party. It is the understanding of the Working Group
that an operator is permitted to enter such reservations. With this
understanding specific language in the text was not considered
necessary. 15
Some delegations urged that the language of the text be sufficiently
flexible to permit acceptance of goods without documentation being
issued at all if the terminal operator and the customer so agree. The
U.S. Delegation supported this point of view and the current draft
follows it. However, several other delegations favored the issuance of
a document under all circumstances.
The paragraph does not define what would be "unreasonable
delay" in acknowledging or issuing documentation. The Working
Group assumed that the customary practice of the terminal operators
would be taken into consideration in determining what is unreasonable delay.16
The U.S. Delegation was able to achieve acceptance of the
principle that the phrase "reasonable means of checking" in Article
4(l)(b) would not require a terminal operator to open a sealed
17
container in its charge.

Paragraph (2) was accepted by the Working Group without discussion.
Paragraph (3) provides that the operator may issue the document
referred to in Paragraph 1(b) "in any form which preserves a record
of the information contained therein." Again the U.S. Delegation
advocated paperless documentation and this language assures that
paper documentation is not required; electronic data processing is
14Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 9.
'1Id.
161d. at 8.
171d. at 9. A similar understanding applies to the same phrase in the Hamburg Rules, Art.
16(1).
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satisfactory. The Working Group noted that this paragraph does not
18
state how long the operator must preserve a record.
It should be noted that Paragraph (4) no longer requires a handwritten signature by the operator. This development will also facilitate paperless documentation. However, if the operator does not sign
the document the operator is presumed to have accepted the goods in
apparent good order.1 9 The U.S. Delegation had proposed a paragraph stating that the absence from the document of information
required in Paragraph (1) should not affect the existence or validity of
the contract between the customer and the operator. They argued
that other legal instruments, such as the Warsaw Convention on air
carriers' liability, contain such a provision. The Working Group was,
however, of the view that the documentation under the Warsaw
Convention has a more vital role in the liability regime of that
convention than does the document under the Uniform Rules on
terminal operators' liability. Such a provision was therefore not
included. 20 However, the issue may be raised again at the UNCITRAL Plenary Session.
Article 5-Basis of Liability
(1) The operator is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the
goods, as well as for delay in handing over the goods, if the occurrence
which caused the loss, damage or delay took place during the period of
the operator's responsibility for the goods as defined in article 3, unless
he proves that he, his servants, agents or other persons of whose
services the operator makes use for the performance of the transportrelated services took all measures that could reasonably be required to
avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
(2) Where a failure on the part of the operator, his servants, agents or
other persons of whose services the operator makes use for the
performance of transport-related services to take the measures referred
to in paragraph (1) combines with another cause to produce loss,
damage or delay, the operator is liable only to the extent that the loss
resulting from such loss, damage or delay is attributable to that failure,
provided that the operator proves the amount of the loss not attributable thereto.
(3) Delay in handing over the goods occurs when the operator fails to
hand them over or make them available to a person entitled to take
delivery of them, within the time expressly agreed upon or, in the

181d.
19 See Article 4(2).
2
Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 9-10.
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absence of such agreement, within a reasonable time after receiving a
request for the goods by such person.
(4) If the operator fails to hand over the goods or make them available
to a person entitled to take delivery of them within a period of 30
consecutive days after the date agreed upon or, in the absence of such
agreement, within a period of 30 consecutive days after receiving a
request for the goods by such person, the goods may be treated as lost.
Comment
In regard to Paragraph (1) there was general agreement within the
Working Group on the existing text. A liability system of presumed
liability of the terminal operator is consistent with the legal systems
of most transportation legal regimes. 2 1 A question exists whether the
reference to "loss" in the first sentence includes consequential loss.
It is noted that this phrasing is well established in the Multimodal
Convention and the Hamburg Rules. 22 Furthermore, the loss is
subject to limitation of liability. Consequently, the word "loss" was
retained.
Paragraph (2) provides a uniform system for exculpating the
operator to the extent that the loss is attributable to faults of carriers,
shippers, or other parties. In line with Paragraph 1, the burden is on
the terminal operator to show the amount of loss not attributable to
him.
Paragraph (3) would establish a uniform regime for loss from delay.
Without such a provision delay would be subject to varying and
inconsistent national laws. This provision would protect carriers and
shippers who might otherwise have difficulty recovering from those
terminal operators who under their national laws can restrict their
liability for delay.
Reference is made to the definition of "request" in Article l(f); it
may be made in any form which preserves a record of the request.
Paragraph (4) reflects the fact that most members of the Working
Group favored a fairly short time limit after which the goods may be
treated as lost. A time period of 30 days was adopted. Again the
definition of "request" in Article 1 is relevant.
Article 6-Limits of Liability
(1) The liability of the operator for loss resulting from loss of or damage
to goods according to the provisions of article 5 is limited to an amount
21
1d.
22

at 10. (See Hague Rules, Art. IV(2)(q).
Supra note 7, at Art. 16, and supra note 13, at Art. 5.
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not exceeding [2.75] units of account per kilogram of gross weight of the
goods lost or damaged. However, if the goods are involved in international carriage which does not, according to the contracts of carriage,
include carriage of goods by sea or by inland waterways, the liability of
the operator shall be limited to an amount not exceeding [8.33] units of
account per kilogram of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged.
(2) The liability of the operator for delay in handing over the goods
according to the provisions of article 5 is limited to an amount
equivalent to two and a half times the charges payable to the operator
for his services in respect of the goods delayed, but not exceeding the
total of such charges in respect of the consignment of which the goods
were a part.
(3) In no case shall the aggregate liability of the operator under both
paragraphs (1) and (2) exceed the limitation which would be established
under paragraph (1) for total loss of the goods in respect of which such
liability was incurred.
(4) The operator may agree to limits of liability exceeding those
provided for in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3).
Comment
The Working Group did not negotiate the amount of the limit of
liability; such issues have traditionally been negotiated at the diplomatic conference. The figure in brackets in paragraph (1) is for
purpose of illustration and was accepted by the Working Group as a
compromise. However, the French Representative observed that this
limit would result in inadequate compensation for goods carried by
air. 23 The French Delegation proposed reservations which would
enable them to apply Warsaw Convention limits to air terminal
operations. Another delegation proposed a reservation permitting
States to apply the Convention only to sea terminals. 24 The Working
Group was of the view that it could not engage in a discussion of
whether reservations should be permitted. 25 This subject will be
discussed at a later time.
Some delegations still prefer a single limit, whereas others would
tie the amount of the applicable limit to the mode of transportation.
The Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany made a
proposal to reintroduce a limitation based on the number of packages
or shipping units. The package concept had been deleted in the
previous session of the Working Group. 26 The German Delegate
23

Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 10.

241d.
25

1d. at 19.
1d. at 11.
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argued that the per package limit would be beneficial in the case of
high value goods, because limitation by weight would not provide
adequate compensation for such goods. However, the prevailing view
in the Working Group was that a package limitation would make
documentation under Article 4 difficult. 27 Many practical problems
have arisen in connection with the per package limit in ocean
transport and it is the source of much litigation in the United States.
This issue will be reviewed in UNCITRAL's request for comments of
Governments and will probably be discussed at the next Plenary
meeting.
Since a limit per package was not adopted, the Working Group did
not specify whether a container is or is not a package.
Paragraph (2) concerns the liability of the operator for delay in
handing over the goods. The presently stated limit of liability is that
of the Hamburg Rules, i.e., two and a half times the charges of the
operator. It was agreed that liability should not exceed the total
charges for the consignment.
The Working Group noted that it would be difficult to calculate
liability limits for delay under some circumstances. One example of
such difficulty would be when the operator maintains a public
terminal where the services are free because the Government requires the goods to pass through it. However, the Group believed that
courts could resolve such difficulties by constructive application of
the Rules.
Under Paragraph (3) the aggregate liability of the operator would
not exceed his liability for total loss. There was no significant dissent
from this concept.
Under Paragraph (4) the operator may agree to higher limits than
those provided in this Article. Similar provisions are found in the
Visby Amendments and the Hamburg Rules.
Article 7-Application to Non-ContractualClaims

(1) The defences and limits of liability provided for in this Convention
apply in any action against the operator in respect of loss of or damage
to the goods, as well as delay in handing over the goods, whether the
action is founded in contract, in tort or otherwise.
(2) If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the
operator, or another person of whose services the operator makes use
for the performance of the transport-related services, such servant,
agent or person, if he proves that he acted within the scope of his
27

1d.
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employment or engagement by the operator, is entitled to avail himself
of the defences and limits of liability which the operator is entitled to
invoke under this Convention.
(3) Except as provided in article 8, the aggregate of the amounts
recoverable from the operator and from any servant, agent or person
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not exceed the limits of
liability provided for in this Convention.
Comment
Paragraph (1) is based on similar provisions in the Hamburg Rules
28
and the Visby Amendments.
Paragraph (2) raises the issue whether the servants, agents or other
persons of whose services the operator makes use should be entitled
to the defenses and limits of the Uniform Rules, regardless of whether
they acted within the scope of their employment. This language
accepts the Working Group's view that scope of employment must be
proved. It was not considered worthwhile to address the issue
whether a minor deviation by the servant, agent or other person of
whom use is made would deprive such person of the liability limits
and defenses. This issue has been left to applicable national law. 29
Paragraph (3) was considered useful, although a question may be
raised whether it is strictly necessary because its essence is implicit
in Paragraphs (1) and (2). Another question is whether this paragraph
should make specific references to Articles 6(4) and 13(2). The
current text follows the wording of the Hamburg Rules and the
Multimodal Convention and omits such additional references.30
Article 8-Loss of Right to Limit Liability
(1) The operator is not entitled to the benefit of the limit of liability
provided for in article 6 if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay
resulted from an act or omission of the operator himself or his servants
or agents done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay, or
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would
probably result.
(2) Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph (2) of article 7 a servant
or agent of the operator or another person of whose services the
operator makes use for the performance of the transport-related services is not entitled to the benefit of the limit of liability provided in
article 6 if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay resulted from an
28

Supra note 7, at Art. 20, and supra note 13, at Art. 7.
Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 11 and 19.
30
Supra note 7, at Art. 20, and supra note 13, at Art. 7.
29
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act or omission of such servant, agent or person done with the intent to
cause such loss, damage or delay or recklessly and with knowledge that
such loss, damage or delay would probably result.
Comment

Paragraph (1) was the subject of considerable discussion in the
Working Group. 31 One view was that the operator should not lose the
right to limit liability if a servant acted intentionally or recklessly and
that the reference to servants in this paragraph should be deleted. In
support it was argued that the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal
Convention provide that only the operator's acts or omissions should
be considered in determining loss of the right to limit liability. This
view was not adopted, but it may be urged again.
It was argued that relatively unbreakable limits enable insurers to
predict their risks and thus result in lower insurance costs than when
the limits may be broken more easily. Furthermore, it was suggested
that the customer, rather than the operator, can more efficiently
insure against risks that exceed the liability limits. It was suggested
that because a significant amount of additional loss, damage or delay
is caused by the intentional or reckless acts of servants, agents and
other persons used by the operators, if breakable limits were allowed,
unlimited recovery would be a frequent occurrence, with the consequence that the Uniform Rules would be less attractive.
On the other hand, it was argued that the liability limits in Article
6 are low, and therefore they should be breakable. It was pointed out
that the employees and other persons would be subject to unlimited
liability under Article 8(2) but that they often are uninsured and would
not have the financial resources to pay compensation; therefore the
operator should be liable without limitation for their reckless or
intentional acts.
It was also suggested that the approach in the Hamburg Rules was
a package deal, the focus of which was the elimination of the nautical
fault defense, which does not exist for the terminal operator, plus the
low limit of liability and its virtual unbreakability. 32 Finally, it was
pointed out that an incorporated operator acts only through servants
and that such an operator could avoid loss of a right to limit liability
for intentional or reckless acts if the reference to servants were
removed.
3
MWorking
32

Id.at 12.

Group Report, supra note 9, at 11-12.
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As currently drafted, this paragraph provides that the operator will
be liable for the intentional and reckless acts of employees, but not
for the acts of independent contractors used by the operator. The
Working Group was of the view that "servants and agents" should
not be interpreted so as to include independent contractors. 33 The
Working Group agreed to examine the issue of the operator's
unlimited liability for reckless and intentional acts of agents and
servants at the UNCITRAL Plenary Session in 1989. The Working
Group considers it important that governments review the extent to
which economic efficiency and preferences of insurance interests
should determine whether liability limits should not be breakable.
One delegation proposed that a claimant should be required to
prove that employees acted within the scope of their employment
before subjecting the operator to unlimited liability under Article
8(2).34 Reference was made to a similar provision in the Warsaw

Convention. Other delegates were of the view that such additional
language was superfluous because it is implied that employees must
be acting within the scope of their employment in order to be
considered employees. However, another view was that Article 5(1)
contains an ambiguity regarding whether the reasonable measures
which will excuse the operator from liability refer only to reasonable
measures taken by servants and agents within the scope of their
employment. At the end of the discussion the Working Group could
not agree to adopt this proposal. 35 However, the issue will probably
be raised again.
Paragraph (2) provides that servants and agents and other persons
of whose services the operator makes use may also forfeit the benefit
of limited liability if they cause loss, damage or delay intentionally or
recklessly. This provision could result in unlimited liability of the
operator in those cases in which servants, agents, or other persons of
whose services the operator makes use intentionally or recklessly
cause loss, damage or delay. The reason is that a recourse action
against the operator could result in unlimited liability of the operator
in situations where he would not otherwise be held to unlimited
liability. On the other hand Paragraph (2) will rarely be used, because
actions are practically always brought against the operator, and not

33

1d. (This is consistent with similar discussions on the Visby Amendments and the Hamburg

Rules.)
34Id.
35
1d. at 13.
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against servants, agents or other persons of whose services the
operator makes use.
It may be argued that Paragraph (2) should be retained because of
the relationship between Articles 7 and 8, i.e., the servants and agents
and other persons of whose services the terminal operators make use
are entitled to the defenses and limits of the Uniform Rule the same
as the operator. Consequently, Paragraph (2) is necessary to complete the legal scheme under which operators and their servants,
agents and other persons of whose services they make use can benefit
from the defenses and limits of the Uniform Rules, but with the
possibility of loss of limitation of liability when their acts are
intentional or reckless. This arrangement is identical to that found in
the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Convention.36
Article 9.-Special Rules on Dangerous Goods

If dangerous goods are handed over to an operator without being
marked, labeled, packaged or documented in accordance with any
applicable law or regulation relating to dangerous goods, and if, at the
time the goods are handed over to him, the operator does not otherwise
know of their dangerous character, he is entitled:
(a) To take all precautions the circumstances may require, including,
when the goods pose an imminent danger to any person or property,
destroying the goods, rendering them innocuous, or disposing of them
by any other means, without payment of compensation for damage to
or destruction of the goods resulting from such precautions, and
(b) To receive reimbursement for all costs to the operator of taking the
measures referred to in subparagraph (a),
Comment

There was agreement within the Working Group that the Uniform
Rules should deal with terminal operators' responsibility for dangerous goods. The operators should be informed of the dangerous nature
of the goods; they should be permitted to take all precautions
necessary to avoid danger to property and to persons, and should
receive reimbursement for the cost of taking those precautions.
Often there is no contractual relationship between the shipper and
the operator. Thus the Working Group agreed on a formula for Article
9 that imposes obligations generally, without identifying the specific
person. The U.S. Study Group considered whether terminal opera36

Supra note 7, at Art. 21, and supra note 13, at Art. 8.
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tors should have the right to recover damages from shippers for
improperly packaged dangerous goods. 37 It appears that the Hamburg
Rules formula, 38 under which carriers may obtain reimbursement
from shippers for damage caused by improperly packaged dangerous
goods, provides an acceptable analogy for the terminal operators'
reimbursement from shippers for such damage.
The lack of reference in Subparagraph (a) to compensation for
other types of losses does not imply that there is no compensation. It
merely indicates that this issue is governed by other applicable law.
Article 10-Rights of Security in Goods
(1) The operator has a right of retention over the goods for costs and
claims relating to the transport-related services performed by him in
respect of the goods during the period of his responsibility for them.
However, nothing in this Convention shall affect the validity under any
applicable law of any contractual arrangements extending the operator's security in the goods.
(2) The operator is not entitled to retain the goods if a sufficient
guarantee for the sum claimed is provided or if an equivalent sum is
deposited with a mutually accepted third party or with an official
institution in the State where the operator has his place of business.
(3) In order to obtain the amount necessary to satisfy his claim, the
operator is entitled to sell the goods over which he has exercised the
right of retention provided in this article to the extent permitted by the
law of the State where the operator has his place of business. The
preceding sentence does not apply to containers which are owned by a
party other than the carrier or the shipper and which are clearly marked
as regards ownership except in respect of repairs of or improvements to
the containers by the operator.
(4) Before exercising any right to sell the goods, the operator shall
make reasonable efforts to give notice of the intended sale to the owner
of the goods, the person from whom the operator received them and the
person entitled to take delivery of them from the operator. The operator
shall account appropriately for the balance of the proceeds of the sale
in excess of the sums due to the operator plus the reasonable costs of
the sale. The right of sale shall in other respects be exercised in
accordance with the law of the State where the operator has his place
of business.
Comment
Under Paragraph (1) the operator would have a right of retention,
of the goods (i.e., a possessory lien) to obtain compensation for the
37
38

See Attachment 1.
Supra note 13, at Art. 13.
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cost of services rendered. The operator and a customer would also be
able to extend that security interest to cover other goods if such an
extension was permitted under local law.
Paragraph (2) was accepted by the Working Group without much
discussion. The operator may not retain possession of the goods "if
a sufficient guarantee is provided or if an equivalent sum is deposited
with a mutually accepted third party or with an official institution in
the State where the operator has his place or business." 39 It may be
difficult to find such an "official institution" in the United States;
however, such arrangements are common in other countries.
Paragraph (3) provoked considerable discussion. The Working
Group was in agreement that the operator should, as a last resort,
have the right to sell the goods to satisfy a lien or other security
interest, if permitted by the local law. Questions were raised concerning selection of the law of the place where the operator's services
were performed as the governing local law. One delegation expressed
a preference for application of the law of the State where the goods
were located. The Working Group discussion returned to the questions raised in Article 2 and the resolution was again to use the Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods4o as the model. The
Group finally decided to select the law of the State where the operator
has his place of business as the law applicable to the sale of the goods.
Some terminals straddle borders between States and operators could
be tempted to place the goods in the section of the terminal with the
most favorable local law. For that reason application of the law of the
location of the goods was objectionable. While the Working Group
agreed that application of the law of the operator's place of business
seemed the better solution, it was noted that this might establish a
right to sell the goods when the law of the place where the goods are
located does not permit such a sale.
The U.S. Delegation succeeded in obtaining a provision that while
operators may sell goods to satisfy unpaid claims, they may not sell
containers in which goods are stored if such containers belong to third
parties, such as leasing companies. There was considerable discussion about this right of sale and an exception to the exception would
continue the operator's sale of leased containers for costs and
operators' repairs or improvement to the containers. 4' This question
may be raised again at the UNCITRAL Plenary in 1989.
39

Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 19-20.
4°Supra note 12.
41Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 14 and 20.
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Which categories of people should be entitled to receive notice of
sale? Should they include not only the owners of the goods but also
the persons from whom the operator received the goods, and possibly
others? Under the current text the operator's obligation to give notice
is limited to the owner of the goods, the person from whom the
operator received them, and the person entitled to receive them from
the operator. Relevant is the definition of "goods" in Article 1(e),
according to which provision notice must be given not only to the
individual owners of the goods but also to the owners of separately
owned "containers, pallets or similar articles of packaging or transport if the goods are consolidated or packaged therein and the article
of packaging or transport was not supplied by the operator."
A rather nebulous phrasing is used regarding distribution of the
proceeds of a sale, i.e., that the operator shall account "appropriately" for the balance in excess of the sum due the operator, plus the
reasonable cost of the sale. The reason is that in some countries sales
are conducted by judicial authorities.
Finally, the Working Group decided that the right of sale should in
other respects be conducted in accordance with the law of the place
where the services were rendered by the operator. It was thought
necessary to select the choice of law rule which would determine the
governing legal system.
Article 11-Notice of Loss, Damage or Delay
(1) Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the general nature of the
loss or damage, is given to the operator not later than the working day
after the day when the goods were handed over to the person entitled
to take delivery of them, the handing over is primafacie evidence of the
handing over by the operator of the goods as described in the document
signed or issued by the operator pursuant to article 4 or, if no such
document was signed or issued, in good condition.
(2) Where the loss or damage is not apparent, the provisions of
paragraph (1) apply correspondingly if notice is not given within 7
consecutive days after the day when the goods reached their final
destination, but in no case later than 45 consecutive days after the day
when the goods were handed over to the person entitled to take
delivery of them.
(3) If the operator participated in a survey or inspection of the goods at
the time when they were handed over to the person entitled to take
delivery of them, notice need not be given to the operator of loss or
damage ascertained during that survey or inspection.
(4) In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage to the
goods, the operator and the person entitled to take delivery of the goods
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must give all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and
tallying the goods.
(5) No compensation shall be payable for loss resulting from delay in
handing over the goods unless notice has been given to the operator
within 21 consecutive days after the day when the goods were handed
over to the person entitled to take delivery of them.
Comment

The Working Group deleted a provision in Paragraph (1) for oral
notice of apparent damage. While paper notice is not required by the
new general definition of "notice" in Article 1(e), such notice "must
be given in a form which provides a record of the information
contained therein.' '42

Paragraph (2) raises the question of whether the notice period for
non-apparent loss or damage should begin to run from the time of
receipt of the goods by the person entitled to take delivery, or
whether it should run from the time when the goods reach their final
destination. It is generally thought that non-apparent damage will not
ordinarily be discovered until the goods reach their ultimate destination. Notice would then have to be given within seven days. In no
case may the notice period exceed 45 consecutive days from the day
when the goods are handed over to the person entitled to receive
delivery. The latter provision will protect the operator in those cases
where the goods do not reach their ultimate destination for a long time
after leaving the terminal. The 45-day notice period will establish
certainty as to when the primafacie effect of failure to give notice
begins. A question remains whether a different notice period should
apply to claims against terminal operators than against air carriers
under the Warsaw Convention and to ocean carriers under the
Hamburg Rules.
A question was raised regarding the ambiguity of the phrase "final
destination." It could refer to an inland container terminal where the
container is left, or it could refer to the consignee's place of business.
The Working Group agreed that the term "final destination" refers to
"the final recipient of the goods who would be in a position to inspect
them.'"43
A proposal to eliminate the seven-day notice period and instead to
rely only on the 45-day period was not adopted.
42
See
43

comment on Art. l(e), supra.
Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 15.
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Paragraph (3) would make it unnecessary to give notice of loss or
damage discovered during a joint survey by the person entitled to
receive the goods and by the operator.
Paragraph (4) would require the operator and the persons entitled
to take delivery of the goods to provide opportunity for each other to
inspect the goods.
Paragraph (5) would entitle the operator to 21 days notice of loss
from delay, commencing from the day when the goods were delivered. This notice period is shorter than the notice periods of the
Warsaw Convention and the Hamburg Rules. 44 It was suggested
during the Working Group discussions that a 21-day time period
would be too long; however this suggestion was not adopted.
The Working Group agreed 45 that the time periods in Article 11
may be found too short in specific cases, and that the parties would
be free to agree on longer time limits; however, such agreements
would be subject to the constraints of Article 13(1), which nullifies all
contractual stipulations which derogate from the provisions of the
46
Uniform Rules.
Article 12-Limitation of Actions
(1) Any action under this Convention is time-barred if judicial or
arbitral proceedings have not been instituted within a period of two
years.
(2) The limitation period commences on the day on which the operator
hands over the goods or part thereof to a person entitled to take
delivery of them, or, in cases of total loss of the goods, on the day the
operator notifies the person entitled to make a claim that the goods are
lost, or, if no such notice is given, on the day that person may treat the
goods as lost in accordance with article 5.
(3) The day on which the limitation period commences is not included
in the period.
(4) The operator may at any time during the running of the limitation
period extend the period by a declaration in writing to the claimant. The
period may be further extended by another declaration or declarations.
(5) A recourse action by a carrier or another person against the
operator may be instituted even after the expiration of the limitation
period provided for in the preceding paragraphs if it is instituted within
90 days after the carrier or other person has been held liable in an action
against himself or has settled the claim upon which such action was
based and if, within a reasonable period of time after the filing of a claim
44Supra
note 7, at Art. 24, and supra note 13, at Art. 19.
45
Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 14.
46See comment on Art. 13, infra.
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against a carrier or other person that may result in a recourse action
against the operator, notice of the filing of such a claim has been given
to the operator.
Comment

Paragraph (1) would establish a 2-year limitation of time for suit.
The Working Group agreed that the time when "judicial or arbitral
proceedings have been instituted" refers to "the time when the
proceedings were legally considered to have come into being, which
depended on the applicable legal system." 47 The view was also
expressed that the 2-year limitation period might be extended as
provided by local law, but this view was not adopted.
Paragraphs (2)-(4) would establish the time when the limitation
period would begin. The operator could extend the limitation period
"in writing." It is possible that the reference to written extensions of
time should be changed to provide for possible paperless communication. For example, any form of writing which provides a record of
the information 48 might be deemed satisfactory. This issue may be
raised during the UNCITRAL Plenary Session. However, these
paragraphs were approved without significant discussion.
Paragraph (5) would provide that recourse actions against the
terminal operator could be instituted after the 2-year limitation period
had expired if instituted within 90 days after the original defendant
(e.g., a carrier) had been held liable or had settled the claim and if
such defendant had given notice to the operator of the possibility of
a recourse claim. In the Working Group a proposal was made and
rejected that such an opportunity should also exist in those cases
where the original defendant had settled a claim without an action
having been brought. 49 Concern has been expressed that the terminal
operator could be exposed to liability for too long a period of time if
the original defendants waited to bring a recourse action until the
original claim was settled. However, this concern was resolved by
requiring that a reasonable period of notice of the potential recourse
action be given to the terminal operator.
Article 13-ContractualStipulations

(1) Unless otherwise provided in this Convention, any stipulation in a
contract concluded by an operator or in any document signed or issued
47

Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 15.

48See
definition of "notice" in Art. l(e), supra.
49
Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 15.
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by the operator pursuant to article 4 is null and void to the extent that
it derogates, directly or indirectly, from the provisions of this Convention. The nullity of such a stipulation does not affect the validity of the
other provisions of the contract or document of which it forms a part.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the
operator may agree to increase his responsibilities and obligations
under this Convention.
Comment

Article 13 was approved without change by the Working Group. At
its previous session the Group had heard with interest the comments
of the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The airlines
have been concerned with the possible effect of the Uniform Rules on
their ground-handling contracts, because airlines often contract with
other airlines or with local ground-handlers for local terminal services. However, the IATA representative stated that the Uniform
Rules would not clash with airline ground-handling contracts. The
liability limits of the ground-handling contracts are identical to those
of the Warsaw Convention. The IATA representative noted that the
higher limits of the Warsaw Convention would prevail according to
Article 13(2) of the Uniform Rules.5 0
Article 14-Interpretationof This Convention

In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application.
Comment

This article is similar to corresponding provisions in other liability
conventions. Efforts were made at Working Group sessions to use the
more lengthy formula of the Convention on the International Sales of
Goods, but this simple formula, similar to that in the Hamburg Rules,
seems to be adequate.51

50

Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the Work of its Tenth

Session, A/CN.9/287 at 21-22.
51Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 21.
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Article 15-InternationalTransport Convention
This Convention does not modify any rights or duties which may arise
under an international convention relating to the international carriage
of goods which is binding on a State which is a party to this Convention
or under any law of such State giving effect to or derived from a
convention relating to the international carriage of goods.
Comment
The provision that the Convention shall not modify rights and
duties arising under other transportation conventions, or under the
laws of States "giving effect to or derived from a convention relating
to the international carriage of goods" was included because some
States have adopted the provisions of international transportation
conventions by national legislation, without ratifying the conventions
(as the United States did in 1936, in the case of The Hague Rules,
which it did not ratify until 1937. The Federal Republic of Germany
urged adoption of this formula, although some States doubted its
wisdom). The Uniform Rules frequently defer to local law and this is
merely another example of such deference, although the objective is
to preserve the uniformity of international transportation law. This is
not unlike a similar deference to mandatory national law in Article 19
of the 1980 Multimodal Convention. 52 This issue will probably be
53
revisited.
Article 16-Unit of Account
(1) The unit of account referred to in article 6 is the Special Drawing
Right as defined by the International Monetary Fund. The amounts
mentioned in article 6 are to be expressed in the national currency of a
State according to the value of such currency at the date of judgment or
the date agreed upon by the parties. The equivalence between the
national currency of a contracting State which is a member of the
International Monetary Fund and the Special Drawing Right is to be
calculated in accordance with the method of valuation applied by the
International Monetary Fund in effect at the date in question for its
operation and transactions. The equivalence between the national
currency of a Contracting State which is not a member of the International Monetary Fund and the Special Drawing Right is to be calculated
in a manner determined by that State.
52

Supra note 7, at Art. 19.
Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 21-22.
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(2) The calculation mentioned in the last sentence of the preceding
paragraph is to be made in such a manner as to express in the national
currency of the Contracting State as far as possible the same real value
for amounts in article 6 as is expressed there in units of account.
Contracting States must communicate to the Depositary the manner of
calculation at the time of signature or when depositing their instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession and whenever there is
a change in the manner of such calculation.
Comment
Article 16 is consistent with similar provisions in other transportation conventions. It is in the interest of States to express limits of
liability in SDRs in order to preserve international uniformity, but
some formula is necessary to deal with States not members of the
International Monetary Fund, so that eventual world-wide adoption
of the Rules is not foreclosed by the problem of units of account.
Article 17-Revision of Limits of Liability
(1) The Depositary shall convene a meeting of a Committee composed
of a representative from each Contracting State to consider increasing
or decreasing the amounts in article 6:
(a) upon the request of at least one-quarter of the contracting States, or
(b) when an amendment of a limit of liability in respect of loss, damage
or delay of goods set forth in one of the Conventions hereinafter named
is adopted. The Conventions are:*
(2) The meeting of the Committee shall take place on the occasion and
at the location of the session of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law immediately following the event giving rise to
the convocation of the meeting.
(3) In determining whether the limits should be amended, and if so, by
what amount, the following criteria, determined on an international
basis, and any other criteria considered to be relevant, shall be taken
into consideration:
(a) the amount by which the limits of liability in a convention referred
to in paragraph (1)(b) have been amended;
(b) the value of goods handled by operators;
(c) the cost of transport-related services;
(d) Insurance rates, including inter alia, cargo insurance, liability
insurance for operators and insurance covering job-related injuries to
workmen;
(e) The average level of damages awarded against operators for loss of
or damage to goods or delay in handing over goods; and
(f) The costs of electricity, fuel and other utilities.
*The Conventions will be listed in an Annex II when they are selected.-Eds.
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(4) Amendments shall be adopted by the Committee by a two-thirds
majority of its members present and voting.
(5) No amendment of the limits of liability under this article may be
considered less than five years from the date on which this Convention
was opened for signature.
(6) Any amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph (4) shall be
notified by the Depositary to all Contracting States. The amendment
shall be deemed to have been accepted at the end of a period of 18
months after it has been notified, unless within that period not less than
one-third of the States that were Contracting States at the time of the
adoption of the amendment by the Committee have communicated to
the Depositary that they do not accept the amendment. An amendment
deemed to have been accepted in accordance with this paragraph shall
enter into force for all Contracting States 18 months after its acceptance.
(7) A Contracting State which has not accepted an amendment shall
nevertheless be bound by it, unless such State denounces the present
Convention at least one month before the amendment has entered into
force. Such denunciation shall take effect when the amendment enters
into force.
(8) When an amendment has been adopted in accordance with paragraph (4) but the 18-month period for its acceptance has not yet
expired, a State which becomes a Contracting State to this Convention
during that period shall be bound by the amendment if it comes into
force. A State which becomes a Contracting State after that period shall
be bound by any amendment which has been accepted in accordance
with paragraph (6).
(9) The applicable limit shall be that which, in accordance with the
preceding paragraphs, is in effect on the date of the occurrence which
caused the loss, damage or delay.
Comment
Article 17 would establish a way to up-date liability limits that have
become distorted by inflation or deflation. It was decided that the
liability limits should not be adjusted by an automatic procedure
based on a price index. This result conformed with the U.S. position
expressed at the twelfth session of the UNCITRAL Working Group
on International Negotiable Instruments (1982). In the U.S. view
reference to a price index is undesirable because it contributes to
inflation and distorts commodity factor prices. The United States has
54
consistently opposed such a concept in other U.N. bodies.
According to Paragraph (1) the Working Group instead favored a
system which would establish liability adjustment committees. Such
54

Larsen, New Work in UNCITRAL on Stable, Inflation-Proof Liability Limits, 48 J. Air L.
& Corn. 665, 679.
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committees would be convened by the Depositary at the request of a
minimum of one-fourth of contracting States, or when certain relevant transportation conventions' liability limits are amended. Which
conventions are relevant will be determined at the UNCITRAL
Plenary. The UNCITRAL Secretariat has prepared for that meeting
a list of transportation conventions.5 5 Chief among those are other
liability conventions such as the Warsaw Convention, The Hague,
Visby, and Hamburg Rules, the Multimodal Convention, the Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail, and the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road.
UNCITRAL is expected to review whether, for example, changes in
conventions on inland water transport, oil pollution, and hazardous
materials should also be considered.
Clearly, the conference which finalizes the Uniform Rules will
consider those conventions that are in existence at the time of the
conference.56

The Working Group agreed that the reference to when the liability
limits of the transportation-related conventions are adopted refers to
the time when the revision was adopted by the relevant revision
57
conference or committee.
For the purpose of reducing costs and promoting efficiency Paragraph (2) provides that meetings of the review committee shall take
place immediately after an UNCITRAL session, at the location of
such session.5 8 Whether the UNCITRAL Secretariat will be able to
service such a meeting will depend on the approval of appropriate
U.N. administrative bodies.
Paragraph (3) provides that certain criteria, for example changes in
other liability conventions mentioned in Paragraph 1, the value of
goods handled by operators, the cost of services related to transportation, insurance rates, the average level of damages, and the cost of
utilities, would be considered by a committee convened by the
Depositary. Proposals were made to eliminate items on the list of
criteria, for example the cost of services related to transportation,
insurance covering job-related injuries to workers, and the cost of
utilities.59 Only minor revisions were made in the text.
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Article 9 of the 1977 Oil Pollution Convention 6O suggests additional
criteria which deserve consideration, e.g., information concerning
events which may cause damage, increases and decreases in the cost
of goods and services, and the availability of insurance coverage.
Furthermore, the application of criteria could be mandatory or could
be provided to the revision committee as a guide.
Paragraph 4 would require adoption of changes in the liability limits
by a two-thirds majority of the review committee. The United States
and other countries would be able to participate in any discussion of
revised liability limits even if they did not ratify a convention on
terminal operators' liability, but they would not be able to vote if they
did not adopt the Convention. An amendment to the limits could be
adopted by a two thirds majority of Contracting States present and
voting.
Paragraph (5) provides that amendment of the liability limits could
not be undertaken before the Convention had been opened for
signature for at least five years. Thus a period of status quo would be
required. Furthermore, it would also be possible that the review
committee could be convened by the Depositary before entry into
force of the Convention; however, the legal status of the committee
prior to entry into force may need to be examined.
A proposal was made that further revisions of the liability limits
could not take place less than five years after the previous revision.
The objective of the proposal was to promote stability of liability
limits. However, the prevailing view was that liability limits should be
adjusted whenever required by the circumstances (except for the
initial five-year period).6 1

Paragraph (6) provides that an amendment would be deemed to
have been adopted at the end of 18 months after a State had been
notified, unless at least 1/3 of the Contracting States notified the
Depositary that they did not accept the amended limit.
The expedited adoption procedures in Paragraphs (6)-(8) are generally based on similar amendment procedures in the 1980 Convention Concerning International Transport by Rail (COTIF). This
procedure assures universal adoption of the adjusted liability limits.
As illustrated in Paragraph (7), this procedure provides for denunciation by any State which does not accept a revised liability limit.
However, a State which fails either to accept or denounce may
6°Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, London, 1977.
61
Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 17.
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become bound by the amendment. This amendment procedure raises
the issue of tacit amendment of conventions, a procedure which
exists in a number of transportation treaties negotiated in IMO and
62
other U.N. bodies.
Finally, a U.S. proposal that the applicable liability limit should be
that in effect on the date of the occurrence of the loss, damage or
delay was adopted as Paragraph (9). This provision corresponds to a
similar provision in Article 42 of the Guatemala Protocol to the
Warsaw Convention. A proposal was made that this provision should
appear in Article 6 on limits of liability, but it was not adopted. 63

CONCLUSION
Whether the Uniform Rules should be in the form of model
legislation or a new international convention may be discussed again
at the 1989 UNCITRAL Plenary. The U.S. Study Group favored the
convention approach because it would most effectively promote
uniformity of law. 64 Also, a model law on terminal operators' liability
would not fill gaps already present in the fabric of transportation
conventions. A large majority of the UNCITRAL Working Group
favored the convention approach for the same reasons. 65 Their feeling
was that if this project deserves UNCITRAL's attention it should be
prepared in the most effective form.
The draft Transport Terminal Operators' Liability Convention is
intended to fill a gap in the legal regimes governing the users of
transport terminals. The Convention reflects the influence of the
other legal regimes. However, it is increasingly apparent that the
unique subject of terminal operation requires different rules than
those applicable to the users. The special rules governing air, marine,
road, and rail carriers do not appear in the terminal operators' draft
Convention. Thus the draft should be evaluated purely on the basis of
whether it would improve the law applicable to international trade.
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Larsen, supra note 54, at 658.
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64Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 17 and 22.

See Annex I.
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Working Group Report, supra note 9, at 17.
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Annex I
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE STUDY GROUP ON
THE LIABILITY OF OPERATORS OF TRANSPORT
TERMINALS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
December 11, 1987
The subject meeting was convened at 10:00 a.m. at the Department
of Transportation in order to obtain advice for the forthcoming
meeting of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group on International Trade Practices
to be held in New York on January 18-29, 1988. The Working Group
meeting will continue its consideration of uniform liability rules for
transport terminal operators.
The meeting was chaired by Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal
Adviser for Private International Law, Department of State, and
Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Committee....
The group focused its attention on the US Delegation report on the
last meeting of UNCITRAL's Working Group (December 1-12,
1986), which included draft uniform rules prepared by the Working
Group.
The following issues were considered by the study group:
1. Whether the uniform rules should be in the form of model
legislation or a new international convention? The study group tended
to favor the treaty approach because it would promote greater
uniformity of law. The representative from the insurance industry
noted that related legal instruments, e.g., the Hamburg Rules and
Warsaw Convention, are in treaty form and that model legislation for
terminal operators would not fit as well into the context of legal
regimes for transportation. It was noted that only a treaty would
result in predictable law. Mr. Pfund noted that there were substantial
financial implications in the convening of a conference to adopt a
convention. It was expected that the UNCITRAL working group will
first seek agreement on the substance of the uniform rules before
proceeding to the question of the form of such rules.
2. Should terminal operators have an option regarding whether or
not to use the uniform rules? The representative from the insurance
industry stated that such an option would result in lack of uniformity
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and predictability. The study group did not favor the optional
approach.
3. Should stevedores be excluded from the application of the
uniform rules? The stevedores' representative favored such exclusion. However, he stated that the proposed draft exclusion of
stevedores would exempt 90% of all terminal operations from the
application of the uniform rules. Representatives of shipper and cargo
insurance interests stated that such an exclusion would be too broad
and they, in fact, favored inclusion of stevedores. The group agreed
that the Department of Transportation should provide policy guidance on this issue.
4. What form of documentation, if any, should be provided by
terminal operators to their customers? The study group was of the
view that terminal operators should use either their own documentation or carriers' documentation. The terminal operators should have
discretion to decide which documentation to use. It was noted that
the weight of the cargo may be difficult to ascertain but the group was
reminded that liability limits are based on weight. The shippers
informed the group that tampering with sealed cargo is also a problem
and should be discussed in UNCITRAL.
5. What should be the regime governing the terminal operators'
liability? No objection to the draft uniform rules on this point was
expressed. The group discussed the current non-uniform law of
bailments as it applies to terminal operators.
6. What should be the limits on liability of the terminal operator?
The study group did not object to the present draft proposal. Specific
limits will be further discussed in future.
7. How should liability limits be adjusted for inflation? The group
favored a clause which would adjust liability limits for erosion by
inflation. The representative of the airline industry strongly favored
such a clause, while insurers were less enthusiastic.
8. Should servants and agents be entitled to the benefits of the
uniform rules? The group favored such entitlement.
9. Should there be provision for forfeiture of limitation of liability?
It was agreed that policy guidance should be obtained from the
Department of Transportation on whether limits of liability should be
unbreakable. It was suggested by an admiralty professor that unbreakable limits would help to avoid punitive damages.
10. Should the terminal operator have the right to recover damages
from shippers for improperly packaged dangerous goods? It was
generally agreed that the Chemical Manufacturers Association should
be consulted in this regard.
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11. Should the uniform rules define the form of notice required
under the rules? The group agreed that written notice of damage
should be provided to terminal operators. This point was particularly
emphasized by a member representing insurance interests.

